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and companies of the United States, can reject foreign judgments when
evidence exists that the judgment was influenced by corrupt forces. 178
Section 482 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
supports this conclusion by stipulating that if a foreign court fails to be
fair or impartial, the United States court is not bound to follow it. 179
Here, FBJ produced evidence of impropriety on the part of the Russian
courts. Several documents detailed a meeting between the deputy
chairman of the Russian Federation and a representative from the
Arbitrazh where the litigation between SMS and FSUESMS, as well as
the need to protect state interests, were addressed. 180 The documents
demonstrated improper influence and justified the United States court's
decision not to defer to the Russian judgment.

F. Holding of the Court
The Court denied Berov's motion for reconsideration, basing its
determination on the flawed logic of the court and viable allegations of
judicial misconduct. 181

G. Conclusion
In declining to defer to the Arbitrazh' s decision and
acknowledging the political corruption of the Arbitrazh, the Court
highlighted the paramount importance of United States business
interests and the judiciary's protectionist role in international law. In
addition, by refusing to defer to the Russian decision, the Court made a
political point and demonstrated its intolerance for judicial corruption.

P. Carey Kulp
VI. NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT

United States ofAmerica v. Schultz
A. Introduction
In United States of America v. Schultz, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit examined whether conspiring to take
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Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 207.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. b
Id. at 208.
Id. at 216.
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antiquities that were owned by the Government of Egypt under
Egyptian Law 117 violates the National Stolen Property Act [hereinafter
NSPA]. 182 In analyzing this issue, the Second Circuit analyzed the law
of Egypt- Law 117, the meaning of the term stolen, and the Fifth
Circuit's definition of the NSPA. 183 The Second Circuit found in this
case that the Egyptian antiquities were stolen within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 2315, NSPA. 184 To support this finding, the Second Circuit
stated that property stolen from a foreign government that has
ownership of the propertrs under valid patrimony law is considered
stolen under the NSPA. 85 The Second Circuit has not properly
reviewed the NSPA prior, so in analyzing this case, they applied NSPA
law from other circuits. 186
B. Parties

The plaintiff in this case is the United States of America. 187 The
defendant, Frederick Schultz [hereinafter Schultz] was a successful art
dealer in New York City. 188 Schultz was indicted on "one count of
conspiring to receive stolen" Egyptian antiquities "that had been
transported in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371" and 18 U.S.C. § 2315, NSPA. 189

C. Facts
In 1991, Schultz met Jonathan Parry, a British national, who
showed Schultz a photograph of ancient Egyptian sculptures. 190 One
particular sculpture, the head of Pharaoh Amenhotep III, interested
Schultz, they devised a plan to get this sculpture to the United States for
Schultz to sell in his art gallery. 191 In order to sell the head, Schultz and
Parry invented a fictional collection called the "Thomas Alcock
Collection" and eventually sold the sculpture to Robin Symes"
[hereinafter Symes] for $1,200,000. 192 Three years later, Symes learned
that the Egyptian government was pursuing the sculpture, and asked
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United States ofAmerica v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 401.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 404.
Schultz, 333 F.3d at 393.
Id. at 395.
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Id. at 396.
Id.
Schultz, 333 F.3d at 396.
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Schultz to offer more information as to the origins of the artwork. 193
Schultz failed to provide any additional information to Symes. 194
Parry and Schultz became partners, and together smuggled and
sold approximately six items under the alias the Thomas Alcock
Collection. 195 Parry was eventually caught by the British officials, but
was able to free himself by bribing corrupt members of the Egyptian
antiquities' police to erase his name from all records. 196 Then, Parry
smuggled three more items out of Egypt and sent them to Schultz. 197
Parry was arrested again in 1994 in Great Britain for dealing in
stolen antiquities. 198 Although Parry had been taken into custody in
Britain, he continued to have dealings with Schultz to obtain the three
Egyptian limestone slabs. 199 The communication and letters exchanged
between Schultz and Parry had always indicated that they were aware of
the great legal risk they were taking. 200 This awareness was shown in
the content of the letters and in code or even languages other than
English. 201

D. Discussion
The Second Circuit notes that issues or foreign law are questions of
law. 202 Therefore, in the analysis of Egypt Law 117 of 1983, the court
reviews this law de novo. 203 The standard of review in this case is for
plain error because Schultz did not object to the charge at trial. 204 "To
establish plain error, a court must find l) an error, 2) that it is plain, 3)
that affects substantial rights. "205 "If the error meets these three
considerations then the court considers whether or not to exercise its
discretion to correct the error. " 206

193. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 396.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 398.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 401; FED.R.CRIM.P. 26.1 (2003)(citing parallel rule FED.R.Clv.P. 44.1).
203. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 401.
204. Id. at 413, citing United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 94 (2d.cir. 2000); see also
FED.R.C1v.P. 56 (b).
205. Id. at 413, citing United States v. Kague, 318 F.3d 437, 441- 42 (2d. Cir. 2003).
206. Id. at 413.
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i. Egypt's Law 117

Egypt's Law 117-enacted in 1983 and entitled "The Law on the
Protection of Antiquities"-declared all antiquities discovered after the
enactment of the statute to be property of the Egyptian government. 207
The statute requires all privately owned antiquities prior to 1983 to be
registered with the Egyptian government, and prohibits the removal of
any registered items from Egypt. 208 Thus the law states, in the sanctions
section of the law, "that a person who unlawfully smuggles an antiquity
outside the Republic or participates in such an act shall be liable to a
prison term with hard labor and a fine of not less than 5,000 and not
more than 50,000 pounds."209
Schultz states Law 117 does not apply because it is not within the
policy of the United States "to enforce the export restrictions of foreign
nations."210 The Second Circuit responded to this argument by finding
that Schultz offered no evidence on support of this assertion and even if
his assertions proved to be accurate, the outcome of this case will still
not differ. 211 Furthermore in analyzing Law 117, the Second Circuit
stated that the law not an export- restriction law, it is an ownership
law. 212 This "law is used in Egypt to prosecute people for trafficking in
antiquities within Egypt's borders."21 Although smuggling antiquities
within Egypt is different than smuggling them out of Egypt, they are
both prohibited under Law 117.214
ii. Application of the definition of "stolen " to the NSPA

The Second Circuit also analyzed in this case as to whether the
NSPA applies to cases in which an object was stolen in violation of the
patrimony laws, differs from an object that are stolen in the familiar use
of the word. 215 In looking at the meaning of stolen in this case, the
Second Circuit looked to the Supreme Court definition found in United
States v. Turley since no definition had been adopted in that circuit
under the NSPA. 216 Turley stated that the term "stolen" has no accepted
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Schultz, 333 F.3d at 398.
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id. at 407.
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Schultz, 333 F.3d at 407.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 398-99.
Id. at 409 (citing United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957)).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol31/iss2/12

4

Sethi: 2003-2004 Survey of International Law in the Second: National Sto

2003-2004 Surveys

2004]

349

common law meaning. 217 Furthermore, the Second Circuit accepted
from Turley that the NSPA covers a broader class of crimes than those
contemplated by common law. 218 Thus, the Second Circuit stated that
goods that belong to a person or entity without consent are "stolen" in
every sense of the word. 219 Schultz's actions violated the NSPA
because the antiquities he received were not given consent for Schultz
to take them. 220 The entity to give "consent" in this case is the nation of
Egypt.221
iii. United States v. McClain analysis in the Second Circuit

The Second Circuit has rarely addressed the NSP A, so for the
purposes of this case they looked at the Fifth Circuit's views. 222 In
United States v. McClain [hereinafter McClain], the Fifth Circuit was
one of the only federal appeals court to have addressed whether the
NSPA applies to stolen property under foreign patrimony Law. 223
The defendants in McClain were convicted for violating the NSP A
for importing Mexican artifacts. 224 The Fifth Circuit decided that the
objects were "stolen" within the terms of the NSP A and they stated:
This conclusion is a result of our attempt to reconcile the doctrine
of strict construction of criminal statutes with the broad significance
attached to the word "stolen" in the NSPA. Were the word to be so
narrowly construed as to exclude coverage, for example, with respect to
pre-Columbian artifacts illegally exported from Mexico after the
effective date of the 1972 [patrimony] law, the Mexican government
would be denied protection of the [NSPA] after it had done all it
reasonably could do [to vest] itself with ownership to protect its
interests in the artifacts. This would violate the apparent objective of
Congress: the protection of owners of stolen property. If, on the other
hand, an object were considered "stolen" merely because it was illegally
exported, the meaning of the term "stolen" would be stretched beyond
its conventional meaning. Although "stealing" is not a term of art, it is
also not a word bereft of meaning. It should not be expanded at the
government's will beyond the connotation depriving an owner of its
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Schultz, 333 F.3d at 409 (citing United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957)).
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rights in property conventionally called to mind. 225
The Second Circuit has never decided whether the holding of
McClain should be the law in the Second Circuit. 226 In this case, the
Second Circuit rejected the McClain analysis because the facts in
McClain and this case were too distinguishable. 227
F. Holding of the Court

The Second Circuit concluded in this case that the "NSPA applies
to property that is stolen from a foreign government, where that
government asserts actual ownership of the property pursuant to a valid
patrimony law."228 They found Schultz's other claims to have no
merit. 229 Thus, the findings of the lower court that convicted Schultz in
United States District court for the Southern District of New York is
affirmed. 230 The lower court further found that Schultz violated 18
U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring "to receive stolen property that had been
transported in interstate and foreign commerce."231 Schultz was
sentenced to a term of thirty-three months of imprisonment. 232

G. Conclusion
In this case the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit interpreted the NSPA and how it applied to foreign patrimony
law. 233 Although many circuits have analyzed the NSPA, the relevant
act for stolen foreign goods, the Second Circuit has rarely looked at
In looking at this statute, the Second Circuit
these laws. 234
contemplated Egypt's Law 117, the definition of the term stolen, and
Fifth Circuit's analysis of the NSPA. 235 In looking at these factors, the
Second circuit decided that Egypt's Law 117, does apply to the NSPA
because Egypt's law is clear; the Egyptian government wants to have
absolute ownership of all antiquities found after 1983. 236 Furthermore,
the Second Circuit decided that the term stolen does not have a common
225.
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law meanin~ and thus is not in violation of foreign patrimony law and
the NSPA. 2 7 Finally, the Second Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit's
analysis of the NSPA, because they stated that the facts in the Fifth
Circuit McClain case are distinguishable from this case. 238

Pooja Sethi
VII. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND HABEAS CORPUS PETITION

Wang v. Ashcroft
A. Introduction
In Mu-Xing Wang v. John Ashcroft, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit announced that they had not set forth a
test as to how the Board of Immigration Appeals should apply the facts
to the relevant law in habeas review petitions. 239 A specific test was not
outlined, because the court decided that the Board of Immigration
Appeals [hereinafter BIA] applied the facts properly to the law in
Wang's Convention Against Torture claim. 24 Furthermore, on the due
process claim, in looking at whether Wang has been denied his due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the Second Circuit analyzed this claim as one of
substantive rather than procedural due process. 241 This analysis varies
from how the lower court analyzed the claim; however, the Second
Circuit still denied that there has been a violation of Wang's due
process rights.242

°

B. Parties
The plaintiff, Mu-Xing Wang [hereinafter Wang], a thirty- one
year old Chinese immigrant, entered the United States without being
lawfully admitted. 243 The Superior Court of New Haven Connecticut
convicted Wang of robbery and unlawful restraint and sentenced him to
ten years imprisonment. 244 Wang sought relief and brought action
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